Abstract-DDoS defenses based on network capabilities advocate fundamental changes to the Internet. However, despite the many point solutions, there has not been a rigorous study of the entire solution space for capability architectures. We believe the proposed changes to the Internet will inevitably introduce challenges and tradeoffs. To better understand the tradeoffs and identify challenges, we propose a taxonomy to categorize possible options and map the potential solution space. Our taxonomy identifies key components of capability architectures, separates fundamentals from implementation details, and opens up new directions to explore in these architectures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet service model allows any source to send traffic to any destination without consent from the receiver, and neither does it require a valid source address to deliver packets. Attackers exploit this openness to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, where many compromised hosts (bots) send traffic to a target, crippling end-systems and networks and thus denying service to legitimate clients. Many defenses have been proposed in the literature to remedy the DDoS problem [6] , [5] , [4] , [11] , [9] . Of these, network capabilities [12] , [13] , [10] , [8] advocate fundamental changes to the Internet service model such that packets with authorizations (a capability) are treated preferentially at routers. Capabilities let the receiver specify what traffic it wants to receive and the network enforces those choices.
However, despite the many point solutions in capability architectures [12] , [13] , [10] , [8] , there has not been a rigorous study of the entire solution space. Such a study is important since capabilities is a new idea and the implications are not well understood. Adding capabilities to the Internet introduces unexplored, yet fundamental challenges and trade-offs due to the change in the service model. To understand the challenges, we take a fresh look at proposed capability architectures with the goal of creating a taxonomy. We believe that a taxonomy is necessary to expand the current understanding of the problem and solution space in capability architectures, and provide a framework to compare various existing and future implementations. Capability architectures have significant impact on the Internet in terms of assimilating the new service model, the impact on hardware and software and incremental deployment strategies. Before a verdict is reached on the different proposed solutions we need a common yardstick to compare them and evaluate their tradeoffs.
Our work on the taxonomy has unveiled some additional interesting findings:
• Capabilities alone are insufficient to remedy DDoS as they are susceptible to the colluding attacker problem.
• The general capabilities approach is richer than what existing point solutions may suggest. We identify several new areas that can be explored, such as explicit revocation of credentials, pushing initial capabilities (for setup) to a source, and marking/deciding at locations other than the source/destination and non-cryptographic capabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a brief discussion of capability architectures in Section II and present a simple network model we use to develop the taxonomy in Section III. We then present the taxonomy in Section IV. Using this framework, we evaluate several implementations in Section V. We discuss important open research directions in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
We now briefly describe at a high level how network capabilities provide defense against DDoS attacks. The description is inspired by TVA [13] , but the general concepts apply to other approaches. In capability architectures, a sender that wants to communicate with a receiver needs to obtain authorization (i.e., capability) from the receiver. To get this authorization, the sender starts out by sending an initial capability request packet to the receiver. Routers along the network path insert cryptographically generated tokens into the request. The receiver upon receiving the request decides if it wants to grant authorization to the sender; if so, it cryptographically synthesizes a capability from the router tokens and returns it to the sender. Otherwise, the receiver ignores the request. The sender includes the capability in subsequent data, until either the capability expires, or is revoked by the receiver. The cryptographic operations on capabilities allow routers to easily verify the authorization and give preferential treatment to such traffic.
Capabilities allow the receiver to exert fine grain control over the senders. Senders have to be vetted initially, and misbehaving senders can be filtered by letting their capabilities expire. Filtering bad senders is efficient in terms of keeping unwanted traffic off the network, because in most cases routers near the source are likely to drop unwanted packets. In a broad sense, capability architectures take the receiver's choices to receive, regulate, or reject certain traffic and ask the network to enforce such choices. 
III. NETWORK MODEL
We now introduce a simple network model to identify various players involved in capability architectures. Our model omits intricacies of a physical network, but is specific enough to capture critical components of a network, needed to describe the taxonomy. Figure 1 shows the network model.
The network has several sources, some of which might be DDoS attackers, and some are legitimate clients. We assume the legitimate clients are attempting to reach the destination, while the attackers are targeting it. The source(s) and destination are connected via routers, which could be malicious themselves. The network is distributed, i.e., different administrative authorities control different parts -the source and destination may be controlled by users, their respective networks controlled by organizations (companies, universities, etc), and the core network is controlled by service providers (ISPs). The parties involved in distributed networks may not agree to the same policies, and may be managed with different levels of expertise. These properties complicate the deployment choices for capability architectures.
Our model identifies five important locations. The source and destination, as described above. These are connected to a source border router (SBR) and a destination border router (DBR) respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume packets from the source and destination pass through these routers (note that a site may have multiple border routers as with site-multihoming, but we ignore these cases to keep the model simple). We group the rest of the network into core routers. The policies at the core and border routers are likely different from the policies at the hosts.
IV. A TAXONOMY OF CAPABILITY ARCHITECTURES
In this section, we describe how we arrived at the taxonomy, and discuss the various components of the taxonomy in detail.
A. Towards a Taxonomy
To defend DDoS attacks, capability architectures need to perform three important tasks. First, they need to provide authorizations to packets. We refer to this task as traffic classification in the taxonomy. Specifically, the architecture must provide mechanisms to decide what packets are authorized and then mark those packets. Second, they need to treat packets with authorizations preferentially at routers over packets without authorizations (or that have invalid authorizations). For instance, when a router is about to run out of resources, it may drop packets without authorizations, but allow authorized traffic to pass. We refer to this task as enforcement. Third, capability architectures need to coordinate the classification and enforcement processes and, to accommodate changes in decision and sender behavior they must ensure capabilities expire and are refreshed periodically. We refer to these tasks as management.
These three tasks form the top level categories in the taxonomy, namely. 1) Traffic Classification -defines the actions relating to decision and marking packets into different types. 2) Enforcement -describes the process of taking necessary forwarding actions on packets, and 3) Capability Management -deals with setup and refreshing capabilities in the network. The precise definitions of the terms we use in the taxonomy are described in Table I and Figure 2 shows the resulting taxonomy.
The sub-categories in the taxonomy arise from fundamental questions such as, what, where, how and when an action is performed. For instance, the decision process involved in traffic classification requires understanding "what are the traffic classes?", "where are the decisions made?", "how to decide if a sender is authorized?", and "when to decide if authorizations are needed?". We use various metrics to argue about and understand the tradeoffs an architecture designer has to make when coming up with a new capability architecture implementation. The metrics include, correctness, effectiveness, incentives, deployment issues, and effect on network resources (such as bandwidth, cpu and memory). For example, when choosing the location where decisions are made to grant capabilities, we use correctness of classification as the metric.
B. Traffic Classification: Decision
The first part of traffic classification process is to determine whether a flow is wanted or unwanted. We refer to the node making such decisions as the decider. Figure 2 shows the taxonomy of the decision process under traffic classification.
1) Traffic Types: Capability architectures roughly divide packets into three types, those that have valid capabilities, i.e., wanted traffic, those that have invalid capabilities, i.e., unwanted traffic, and those that have no capabilities, or unclassified traffic. The first two categories follow from the fact that decisions regarding a flow are either to accept (want) or reject (don't want) the flow. However, classifying traffic into wanted or unwanted may not always be possible, or even desirable. For instance, the decider may not have sufficient information to accept or reject the first packet from a new client, or the decider may choose not to classify traffic when it is not under attack. In these cases, the decider leaves the traffic as unclassified.
By definition, all capability architecture implementations must have these three classes, but some may have additional sub-types. For example, PATRICIA [10] defines two subtypes, called control and authorized under the wanted traffic class. We do not consider these sub-types in the taxonomy since they are strictly implementation specific. However, we note that additional traffic classes means the decider may need to expend more resources when classifying traffic. The implementation must weight the tradeoffs associated with the 2) Decision Location: The decision location determines sensitivity, or correctness of classification. In most cases, decisions made at the destination are more accurate, but there are other locations and factors to consider. We present a few arguments for choosing the location for the decider.
• Correctness -Two factors influence correctness: i) knowledge of resources under attack and, ii) knowledge of receiver's policies. This knowledge is more available closer to the destination, i.e., traffic wanted by the destination, traffic in accordance with the receiver's network policies, and congestion information. Specifically, the destination has most knowledge about its own policies and its resource limits, while the DBR knows more about the network policies and condition of the narrow access link. These two locations make good choices for a decider, but beyond them, correctness is difficult to achieve. The core network may have knowledge about congestion, but does not know the receiver's policies.
• Deployment Issues -Traffic classification requires installing a classifier module at the decider. At the destination host, this may be a simple software upgrade, but upgrading a router such as the DBR is more complex. However, deploying the classifier on the DBR benefits multiple destinations downstream from the DBR, whereas installing it on the destination benefits only that one host. The same deployment issues apply when considering marking and enforcement locations.
• Effect on Resources -The classification process consumes cpu and memory resources proportional to the number of flows reaching or transiting the decider. Since a DBR transits traffic for multiple destinations, it needs to commit more resources compared to a host that only needs to keep track of its own flows. These additional constraints play a role in choosing the decider as well.
3) How to Decide: Deciding which flows to accept or reject requires inputs or information at the decider. These inputs could originate locally, entirely based on local policies, they may originate from a distributed entity based on collaborative policies, or may originate from a third-party system using global policies.
More specifically, in local policy based systems the decider may maintain a local reputation value for clients, or a blacklist of misbehaving clients. Other mechanisms include, a local intrusion detection system (IDS), CAPTCHAs to distinguish human users from automated bots, client authentication, and techniques based on computational puzzles [8] and so forth. Alternately, the decider may coordinate with a group of external or internal nodes (including other deciders) which provide additional information in making decisions. We call these collaborative policies. For example, the decider could make decisions depending on input from a collaborative reputation system, or a collaborated blacklist of misbehaving clients. However, in a distributed network different nodes have different interests, so collaborative systems need to address issues with agreement, trust and security between the participants. Finally, the decider could use a service from a third party system to make decisions. Examples include third party reputation systems, global blacklists of misbehaving clients, and/or lists with unallocated address blocks.
4) When to Decide:
An interesting question we raise in the taxonomy is when to invoke the decision process. Although decisions can be made at all times, the process itself consumes resources (cpu, memory), and conserving these resources might be important for some systems. In the taxonomy, we define three possible choices i) decide at all times, ii) decide when under attack, and iii) decide on demand. The later two choices reduce the overhead when there are no ongoing attacks. However, they might raise some new challenges; for instance, how does a decider detect an ongoing attack? How quickly can the decider respond to attacks? Furthermore, initiating the decision process on demand requires authentication between the decider and the requesting party, which further complicates the overall architecture.
These three choices also apply to marking (i.e., when to mark), enforcement and setup. For brevity, we omit the discuss in later sections since they raise similar issues.
C. Traffic Classification: Marking
The second part of the traffic classification process is to mark packets with capabilities. Marking allows the decider to convey its decisions to the network.
1) What to Mark: Marking adds capability bits to packets. Although, conceptually it is possible to mark flows, we do not consider this case in the taxonomy. Marking a flow would mean that the same capability must be used for an unspecified number of packets, which contradicts periodic refresh and change in decision.
2) Marking Location: Although decisions are made closer to the destination, marking closer to the source is more effective since it allows the network to take enforcement actions early. However, in the taxonomy, we consider several locations for marking and offer some insights in choosing these locations.
• Effectiveness -Marking at the source gives the most opportunity for the network to take enforcement actions, i.e., it enables every location from the source up to the destination to enforce. But the SBR, the core and DBR may also mark packets, to allow compliance with their own network policies. For example, an SBR may mark on behalf of its hosts to filter certain client communications. The effectiveness of enforcement reduces as marking is moved closer to the destination.
• Incentives -The source has the most incentive to mark since it wants its traffic to reach the destination. Similarly the SBR may also mark to achieve policy compliance or to save uplink bandwidth, i.e, if its network contains compromised hosts (example: DSL, cable operators). Similar arguments apply to core networks, but the operators in these networks may be hesitant to add tasks to the routers beyond basic forwarding. We believe incentives need to be strongly considered when choosing a marking location. 3) How to Mark: Refers to the techniques used to construct, manipulate and test capabilities. Fundamentally, a capability is a secret between the decider, marker and enforcers and it cannot be guessed easily by an adversary.
A straightforward approach for constructing, manipulating and testing the secret is to use cryptographic techniques. For example, TVA [13] uses keyed hash functions, PATRICIA [10] uses digital signatures in request packets, and PortCullis uses cryptographic puzzles. Alternatively, if any (or all) of these operations can be achieved without using cryptography, we refer to them as non-cryptographic techniques. Note that cryptographic techniques have different requirements and properties; for instance digital signatures require public key infrastructure (PKI), where as keyed hash functions in TVA do not require such an infrastructure. On the other hand, capabilities created from keyed hash functions in TVA are path dependent, while digital signatures are path independent. Non-cryptographic techniques are hard to envision, since most existing capability approaches utilize cryptographic techniques. We discuss this in more detail in Section VI.
D. Enforcement
Enforcement takes forwarding actions depending on the capability in a packet. We refer to the node taking the enforcing action as the enforcer. Since marking is at the packet level, enforcement takes actions on individual packets.
1) Enforcement Location:
The enforcement location determines how quickly unwanted traffic is removed from the network. We consider the SBR, core routers, DBR and destination for enforcement location.
• Effectiveness -Removing unwanted traffic closer to the source is more effective since it saves network resources and prevents the attacker from consuming bottleneck resources in the network. In this regard, the SBR and core routers are likely candidates, but the DBR and the destination also enforce to ensure unwanted traffic is entirely removed.
• Incentives -The source has no incentives to enforce; especially if it is compromised. The SBR, on the other hand, has incentives to block unwanted traffic from leaving its network, considering the source network might be paying for the network service. Similarly, the DBR has more incentive to block unwanted traffic from entering its own network to protect its hosts. Core routers have fewer incentives (save network resources), but are an important location nonetheless. Providing incentives for the core network is an important problem. 2) How to Enforce: The forwarding action taken during enforcement could be to: i) drop a packet, ii)forward it, or iii) rate limit. Conceptually, enforcement starts with verifying the capabilities inside the packet. If it succeeds, the packet is delivered to a scheduler, which takes further action such as forwarding it to the appropriate outgoing interface. If verification fails, the packet is either dropped immediately or delivered to a scheduler, which may then take further actions such as rate limit the packet to a certain rate.
E. Capability Management: Setup
Setup initializes capabilities between the decider, marker and the enforcers. Figure 2 shows capability management with setup and refresh.
1) What to Setup: In the taxonomy we identify two types of capabilities: i) time-limited, which are valid for a specific amount of time, and ii) packet-limited, which are valid for specific number of packets. The length/period of validity of a capability is an important tuning parameter -a capability that is valid longer may authorize several packets, which is harmful if an attacker gets hold of the capability. While a capability with shorter period can only authorize fewer packets, but needs to be refreshed more often, which increases overhead. Note that capabilities might be both time-limited and packet-limited. For example, in TVA, capabilities are both time-limited and packet-limited, while in SIFF, capabilities are only timelimited. Packet limited capabilities require additional state at the enforces to keep track of the authorized packets.
2) Where to Setup: Capabilities are setup (and refreshed) between the decider, marker, and the enforcers. How to choose these locations is already covered in the previous sections.
3) How to Setup: Understanding setup involves understanding how the decider distributes capabilities to the marker and enforcers. In the taxonomy, we consider two very different communication models for setting up capabilities: i) Pull capabilities from the decider, or ii) Push capabilities to the marker.
In the pull approach, the marker requests capabilities from the decider. To do that, it must first discover the decider (since decider could be different from the destination) and then retrieve the capabilities. To learn about the decider, the marker may for example, query an external database such as DNS, or send a control message towards the destination asking for the decider. Following discovery, the markers and enforcers use architecture specific mechanisms to retrieve capabilities. For example, in TVA, the source sends an explicit capability request packet, while the enforcers implicitly learn about the capability as part of the setup (they generate bits of the capability token). However, prior work has shown that this type of retrieval process is susceptible to denial of capability (DoC) attacks [1] , [8] . Additional mechanisms are needed to prevent DoC attacks in the pull model [8] .
In the push approach, the decider pushes capabilities to the marker. However, the decider must first discover the marker associated with a source, and then transfer the capabilities to the marker and enforcers. Similar to the pull approach, the decider may use DNS, or control messages to learn about the marker, and use architecture specific mechanisms to transfer capabilities. Unlike the pull approach, the push approach does not suffer from DoC attacks, since the source no longer needs to ask for capabilities using unprotected request packets. However, to our knowledge, none of the existing capability mechanisms use the push model to setup capabilities. We discuss this in more detail in Section VI.
F. Capability Management: Refresh
Authorizations issued by the decider are not permanent. To ensure continued communication between the ends, the decider needs to refresh capabilities periodically.
1) What to Refresh:
The capabilities established during setup need to be refreshed for two reasons. First, decisions are not static but may change over time. For instance, a source may become malicious, which causes a change in decision. Second, the marker or the enforcers may change, as a result of a path changes or node failures. To accommodate these changes the capabilities need to be refreshed. The decider may choose to increase, decrease, or keep the same number of capabilities at the time of refresh. A special case of decrease is to issue no capabilities at all, which essentially terminates the authorization given to a source. The capabilities issued during refresh may be time-limited or packet-limited.
2) How to Refresh: The decider could use different mechanisms to refresh capabilities, it could issue new capabilities in each refresh cycle, or change the state associated with a capability at routers. Specifically, if we assume each capability initially permits N packets, the decider can request the routers to permit N +n packets to cause an increase, or request N −n to decrease the number of packets permitted per capability. The capabilities can be refreshed through a push or a pull based communication process similar to setup.
3) When to Refresh: Since capabilities expire after a while, they can be refreshed anytime before they expire. However this raises two important issues: 1) the overhead involved in periodic refresh, and 2) the maximum time before a change can take effect. These two issues are effected by the lifetime of a capability, and the duration before which a capability is refreshed. Longer expiration periods cause slower response to decision or node changes (decider must wait until existing capabilities expire), while shorter expiration periods increase overhead. Alternately, if capabilities are refreshed much before they expire, changes can take effect sooner, but it also increases overhead. In addition to these factors, the decider needs to consider round trip time and message loss to determine the maximum duration it can wait before refreshing capabilities.
G. Capability Management: Revocation
An alternative to the (soft-state) refresh mechanism is an explicit (hard-state) revocation. Although refresh and revocation are solutions to the same problem, to our knowledge existing capability implementations largely use the refresh mechanism. We now describe the tradeoffs involved in choosing either the refresh or the revocation mechanism to remove capabilities from the network. Specifically, the tradeoffs we discuss include, delay in response to changes, and overhead.
Unlike refresh, revocation responds quickly to changes since the dominant delay factor is the propagation time for the revocation message to reach the marker and enforcers. However, to revoke capabilities, the decider needs to know the markers and enforcers, and moreover revocation requires additional messages from the decider. These two factors contribute to the overhead in revocation. On the other hand, the delay in response to changes in refresh depends on the lifetime of a capability. Shorter lifetimes decrease this delay, but increase management and message overhead. For example, with shorter lifetimes, the destination needs to update the marker frequently. But the advantage of soft-state refresh is that it does not require the decider to know how to reach all the enforcers.
V. EVALUATION OF EXISTING IMPLEMENTATIONS
Using the taxonomy framework, we compare several capability implementations and point out key differences. Our evaluation covers SIFF [12] , TVA [13] , PATRICIA [10] , Fine Grained Capabilities (FGC) [7] and PORTCULLIS [8] . Figure 3 shows the evaluation results, which points out several unexplored areas (marked in red).
A. Traffic Classification: Decision 1) Traffic Types: The implementations define all three traffic types described in the taxonomy (albeit, with different terminology). However, some crucial differences exist. SIFF treats all packets without capabilities as unclassified traffic, including capability request packets which do not have any capabilities. While all the other implementations classify request packets as some form of wanted traffic. TVA uses fair queueing, PATRICIA uses digital signatures, PORTCULLIS uses puzzles, and FGC uses reputation values to identify wanted request packets. For example, PORTCULLIS treats all request packets with a puzzle solution of difficulty greater than k as wanted traffic.
Within the wanted class, TVA, FGC and PATRICIA apply queueing algorithms to prioritize different flows. However, as we noted in the taxonomy, the enforcers (routers) need to expend more resources with increasing packet classes. The impact of which has not been evaluated in the implementations.
2) Decision Location: The destination is the decider in all implementations, but interestingly PATRICIA involves both the DBR and the SBR in the decision process. However, these nodes are only responsible for making decisions on request packets. The SBR decides if a source is allowed to communicate with the destination (based on its network policies), while the DBR decides if the destination is allowed to accept requests from certain networks. In PORTCULLIS, decisions regarding request packets are made at all location except the source, since the request capacity is a limited resource at every link.
3) How to Decide: The implementations use local policies to make decisions. Collaborative and global policy systems have not been considered in the current implementations.
4) When to Decide: In SIFF, TVA, and FGC, the destination always decides regardless of whether it is under attack or not. In PATRICIA, the destination only decides when it is under DDoS attack. Similarly, in PORTCULLIS, routers require (and check) puzzles in request packets when the destination is under attack. Deciding on demand is not considered in any of the implementations we evaluated.
B. Traffic Classification: Marking 1) Marking Location:
The implementations mark at the source, mainly due to its effectiveness. However, as noted in the taxonomy there are other possible locations for marking which have not been explored.
2) How to Mark: All implementations we evaluated use cryptographic techniques to construct, manipulate and test capabilities. Specifically, SIFF, TVA and PATRICIA construct and test capabilities piece-by-piece at each router using keyed hash functions. In FGC, the capability is a symmetric key shared between the source and the destination. In PATRICIA, the SBR marks request packets with a digital certificate, and in PORTCULLIS, the source solves strong cryptographic puzzles and includes the solutions in request packets.
C. Enforcement 1) Enforcement Location:
Most implementations enforce at all locations except the source. FGC, on the other hand, enforces at the destination and DBR. However, FGC requests core routers to enforce when enforcement at the DBR and destination is alone not sufficient to thwart attacks.
2) How to Enforce: Wanted traffic receives higher priority than other traffic, so it is always forwarded when sufficient bandwidth is available. Unwanted traffic is always dropped in SIFF, but not dropped immediately in TVA, PATRICIA and FGC (it may be dropped upon reaching a congested link). Unwanted request packets are always dropped in PORTCULLIS. A benefit of forwarding packets that fail to verify is that when network paths change, the capability may become invalid at certain enforcers. If the enforcer simply drops the packet the destination may take a while detect and recover from the error, but if instead the enforcer forwards it, the destination may detect the problem and trigger an immediate refresh cycle.
3) When to Enforce: SIFF and TVA enforce at all times, PATRICIA enforces only when the destination is under attack, and FGC enforces on demand. A careful evaluation is needed to understand the impact of these choices. We believe routers may reduce some overhead using the on demand or under attack approach, but they may also allow some unwanted traffic to get through. D. Capability Management: Setup 1) What to Setup: SIFF, FGC and PATRICIA implement time-limited capabilities. TVA implements packet-limited capabilities. PORTCULLIS puzzles are equivalent to packetlimited capabilities (one puzzle solution permits one request packet). Verifying packet limited capabilities requires additional state at routers, which is an important resource to protect.
2) How to Setup: To setup capabilities, SIFF, TVA, PA-TRICIA, FGC and PORTCULLIS use the pull model, but PA-TRICIA implements a two-layer pull mechanism in which the marker requests its SBR for an initial capability (to include in request packet), and uses it to request subsequent capabilities from the destination. PORTCULLIS also implements a twolayer pull mechanism, but with puzzles. The puzzle solutions in the request from a source is treated as a capability, which in turn is used to request subsequent capabilities from the destination. The implementations do not provide sufficient detail in this area, but we believe they support increasing, decreasing or keeping the same number of capabilities in a refresh cycle. To also push new capabilities to the source to cause an increase or to keep the same number of capabilities.
VI. KEY FINDINGS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We now discuss a few important problems and directions uncovered from the evaluation in more detail.
A. Other Decision and Marking Locations
Current capability architectures involve end hosts in setting up capabilities. However, a malicious source may insert bogus capabilities, share its capabilities with others, or steal capabilities issued to a different source. Similarly, a compromised host may authorize a large volume of traffic to its network and cause harm to other hosts in the same network (colluding attacker).
1) Marking locations: Some of these problems can be addressed by using markers other than the source. For example, if marking is done at the source border routers (SBRs) a compromised host can no longer easily steal or insert bogus capabilities. The core routers and destination border router (DBR) may also mark, but the effectiveness is reduced as marking becomes distant from the source. Marking at the SBR, however, requires an additional mechanism to discover the proper SBR (i.e., if multiple SBR exist, the decider needs to know where to send the capabilities).
2) Decider locations: Decider locations determine what information is available to the node granting capabilities to a new client. Such locations include the destination, core network and border routers. Network capabilities fundamentally distinguish between wanted and unwanted traffic. An attacker, however, may be able to use colluders at appropriate places to drive shared bottlenecks into saturation and squeeze out the target traffic without directly attacking the target. To address this TVA proposes fair queueing all wanted traffic, but this is a fragile solution, as the attacker can employ many colluders, effectively neutralizing the FQ controls. PATRICIA involves the DBR in decision making, but this approach works only if the attacker is located within the DBR's network. An alternative is to use collaborative or global decision systems such as multiple DBRs participating in the decision process. However such systems are very hard to implement and deploy. Thus, based on our taxonomy analysis, we argue that capabilities alone cannot address the DDoS problem and other mechanisms are needed. One such approach is to hide the destination so that the attacker cannot locate and target [2] .
B. Non-Cryptographic Capabilities
Cryptographic capabilities are hard to guess or forge. However, they consume cpu resources at both end-hosts and routers, and these resources may be critical at a few network points (such as congested routers). Moreover, they require managing many cryptographic keys. Using non-cryptographic techniques would alleviate these issues, but they must be hard to guess or forge. We sketch a couple of examples next. One possibility is for the destination to create the capability and distribute it to key enforcers, and issue the same capability to a source. The enforcers simply cache the capability and verify it against the one they receive from the source. Another possibility is for the capability itself to dictate the forwarding path to the destination. The decider provides an encoded source route as the capability, and without it packets from a source cannot reach the receiver. For instance, the bloom filter based packet forwarding approach discussed in [3] could be adopted for this purpose.
C. Push Capabilities To Marker
A pull model for setting up capabilities is susceptible to DoC attacks. PORTCULLIS provides a solution to defend against these attacks. However, an alternative is to use a push model for capability setup.
To sketch an example, suppose we disallow the sender from requesting capabilities directly from the decider. Instead, the decider periodically pushes a few initialization-capabilities to a number of trusted intermediaries, say, the SBRs. The senders are required to obtain these initial capabilities from the SBR, so they may send packets to the receiver, and in the process gain additional capabilities for subsequent traffic. The SBRs work in conjunction with the decider, ensuring that offenders are not granted initial capabilities. For instance, the SBRs could install a local blacklist.
To attack this system, the attacker may flood the SBR, but the SBR can easily detect such attacks and isolate the compromised hosts in its own network. An intelligent attacker may use several attack sources to consume all available initialization capabilities from an SBR, but since the decider periodically pushes capabilities, the initialization capabilities are restored shortly. Moreover, the SBR may now categorize these sources as offenders, and either refuse or reduce the number of initialization capabilities granted to these sources.
D. Locating the Enforcers
To verify capabilities the decider needs to signal enforcers. In single path networks the enforcers are located on the path between the source and destination. However, all current designs tie the capability to the path, which will not work in networks where the path changes frequently (e.g., mobile networks). Thus, according to our taxonomy, the enforcement function may have to be easily movable to address many networks. Such ability will also be useful if there are frequent routing changes.
E. Revocation
Explicitly revoking the capabilities allows the destination to quickly cutoff clients that turned into attackers. However, the current implementations do not explore revocation. To see the power of revocation, imagine the destination sending a revocation message for a particular capability to the enforcers, which then temporarily maintain a state to block packets at a very fine granularity, such as packets using that specific capability. When the capability itself expires, the state can be removed. Our taxonomy identified revocation as an important feature of capability architectures.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed capability architectures from ground up to explore the solution space and to better understand the challenges and trade-offs in the new service model. Our analysis produced a taxonomy which identifies the key components of capability architectures, while separating implementation specifics. We show that the components introduce several tradeoffs, notably in effectiveness, deployment, incentives and impact on resources. For example, in most cases the destination is the decider since it has the most knowledge of the resources under attack. However, we argue that involving the destination border router (DBR) in the decision making benefits several destinations and helps enforce network wide policies. But applying software changes to a DBR is harder compared to a host.
The taxonomy provides a systematic framework to compare and analyze current and future implementations. We use this framework to compare several implementations. In addition to mapping the existing work into a common framework, our analysis produced two interesting results. First, it showed that capabilities alone are insufficient to fully address the colluding attackers problem. A capability inside a packet simply grants higher priority, but does not recognize if forwarding that packet would cause harm to other valid traffic. However, we suggest that the problem may be alleviated to some degree if collaborative and global policy based decision systems are used in combination with a DBR as the decider, but such systems are much complex to construct. Next, the evaluation identified numerous open areas that have yet to be explored. For instance, marking at locations other than the source, new approaches involving non-cryptographic capabilities, better capability setup models involving pushing capabilities to the sources and using explicit revocation to quickly remove capabilities granted to a source. We wish to explore these areas in future.
